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Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions? 
Thomas Christiano  
University of Arizona 
 
 
Humanity as a whole currently faces a number of fundamental challenges that can only 
be dealt with on a global scale.  Global warming and other environmental problems, 
severe poverty and the need for a fair system of international trade all call for 
international solutions that are achieved by means of collective decisions.  But these 
solutions will require sacrifices on the part of all persons and there is likely to be a great 
deal of disagreement about the optimal solution and the fairest distribution of the burdens 
imposed by any solution.  We need to have means for making collective decisions that all 
persons and the states of which they are members have good reason to regard as binding 
upon them.   
An institution has legitimacy when it has a right to rule over a certain set of 
issues.  The moral function of the legitimacy of decision-making processes is to confer 
morally binding force on the decisions of the institution within a moral community even 
for those who disagree with them and who must sacrifice.  This morally binding force is 
achieved for a decision-making institution when its directives create content independent 
and very weighty duties to obey the decision maker.  There are three main conceptions of 
the grounds of legitimacy in modern political thought.  One says that the legitimacy of an 
authoritative decision process depends on the quality of the outcomes of the decision 
process.  A second sees the legitimacy of an authoritative process as based on the consent 
of the members.  And the third sees legitimacy as grounded in liberal democratic 
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processes of decision-making.1
My project is to explore the possibility of grounding the legitimacy of 
international institutions and law from a moral cosmopolitan standpoint devoted broadly 
to democratic principles.  It is premised on the idea that when there is substantial 
disagreement among the parties who are deeply affected by international law and 
institutions, moral cosmopolitanism entails the requirement that persons have a say in the 
making of these entities.  Furthermore, the persons must be enabled to participate as 
equals in the process of decision-making.  This implies that the legitimacy of 
international law and institutions is grounded in one of the following principles or a 
principle that combines and transcends three central notions of legitimacy available in 
modern political philosophy: the principle that decisions must conform to minimal 
standards of morality, the principle of fair voluntary association and the principle of 
democracy.
  The latter two forms of legitimacy are particularly salient 
when there is considerable disagreement on how to assess the quality of outcomes. 
2
But there is a further constraint on this exploration of the possibility of legitimate 
international law and institutions.  The conception of legitimacy of international 
institutions must be properly attuned to the evolving nature of these institutions and the 
global political environment they operate in.  Much of traditional political philosophy is 
mostly geared to figuring out the moral norms that apply to modern states.  And some 
basic assumptions about how these political societies operate and what they are capable 
   
                                                 
1 See (Raz 1986) and (Estlund 2007) for mostly results oriented conceptions of authority.  
(Simmons 2001) and (Singer 1974) have defended voluntarist conceptions of authority.  
(Waldron 1999) has defended a purely democratic theory.  (Christiano 2008) and (Klosko 
2004) have defended more complex approaches. 
2 See (Christiano 2008) chapters 3, 4 and 7 respectively.  
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of are presupposed in most discussions.  But our understanding of international political 
institutions tells us that they are not at all like states.  At the same time they are not like 
the other kinds of institutions that get some legitimacy from their members: voluntary 
associations.  And we must respect these differences when we explore questions of 
legitimacy and justification with regard to international institutions.  But they do 
nevertheless have some political power and they will need more political power in order 
to solve some of the problems I described above.   
To get at the peculiar situation political philosophy is in with regard to these 
institutions I lay out a puzzle about how legitimacy is possible for international 
institutions in a world where states are the main players and the main vehicles of 
accountability of political power to persons.  According to the traditional legal doctrine, 
international institutions and international law seem to get their legitimacy from the 
consent of the states that create these institutions.  The traditional account makes no 
reference to persons and eschews cosmopolitanism.  But such an account of legitimacy 
can be grounded in cosmopolitan principles to the extent that the process of consent 
results from fair negotiation among states that represent the persons in their societies as 
equal citizens.  Such a process of consent enables all persons to have a kind of say in a 
process of fair voluntary association among societies.   
Immediately two problems arise: one, fair negotiation implies that parties do not 
take unfair advantage of other parties in the process of negotiation.  And, two, the states 
must all be highly democratic.  As I understand it, taking unfair advantage involves two 
components.  The terms give disproportionate advantages to one party over the other and 
this disproportion arises from the much greater bargaining power of the favoured party.  
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Something like this may be at work in domestic society.  The domestic legal systems of 
modern liberal democratic states attempt to limit unfair advantage taking by providing a 
social minimum for each person, regulating pricing as well as contracts and their courts 
tend to reject highly disproportionate agreements.  The problem in international society is 
that these mitigating circumstances have no counterparts in the international sphere.  
Extremes of poverty are not mitigated thereby enabling some to take unfair advantage of 
others and there is constant complaint about the disproportionate advantages drawn by 
powerful and wealthy states relative to developing societies, the negotiations among 
states in the WTO in the 90’s being a prime example of this.3
The other difficulty is that not all states are democratic and certainly most states 
are not highly democratic.   Democracy is a widespread ideal at the moment and the 
international community seems committed to its diffusion throughout the globe.  Still, the 
question for an account of legitimacy based on fair voluntary association is what to do 
with societies that are not democratic?  They do not represent their peoples very well so it 
would seem that their participation in the making of international law and institutions 
cannot satisfy the cosmopolitan idea behind the process of fair voluntary association.  
And yet their peoples are less well represented if these states do not participate at all.  
Either they should be left out of the process or they should be made more democratic.  
Yet both of these are unsatisfying results because either a substantial portion of the 
world’s population is left out of the process of decision-making or it commits us to a 
highly dubious process of forced democratization.  
   
                                                 
3 See (Steinberg 2002) for an account of this bargaining. 
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But these brief remarks suggest a deep puzzle.  From the above considerations, it 
seems that powerful international institutions are needed to establish the background 
conditions for fair negotiations among states and to ensure that they are democratic.  
Only they can secure the background conditions for fair negotiation.  Only they can 
resolve controversies about when benefits are not grossly disproportionately distributed 
and enforce their judgments.  And only they can effectively promote democracy.  But in 
order to do this successfully they must be able to hold powerful states in check.  
International institutions are either strong enough to hold the most powerful states in 
check or they are likely to be disproportionately controlled by powerful states.4
In the first part of the paper, I will critique the idea of global democracy.  In the 
next part of the paper I will critique the voluntary association model of legitimacy.  These 
  If 
international institutions have the kind of power to hold powerful states in check then the 
problem of legitimacy transfers to them and the ultimate standard by which they would 
be judged is a democratic standard.  But the prospects for global democratic institutions 
are very low at the moment and for the medium term future.  If they are too weak to hold 
powerful states in check and those states have disproportionate control over them, they 
lack legitimacy at least by any remotely democratic standard.  Hence, the two central 
standards of legitimacy, fair voluntary association and democracy, seem to be 
unattainable for international institutions for the foreseeable future at least in the simple 
forms we know them.  The realization of the first standard seems to depend on the 
realization of the second one but the second one is unattainable in part because the first 
one is unattainable on its own. 
                                                 
4 For some striking examples of this see (Steinberg, 2004) and (Doyle, 2009) 
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critical discussions suggest an impasse in our thinking about how international 
institutions and law can be made legitimate.  I will then address some critical remarks to 
an alternative conception of global democracy that has been recently defended.   
I have no solution to this impasse at the moment.  It may be that the best we can 
do at the moment is to ensure that minimal standards of morality or human rights are 
respected and promoted by international law and institutions and to try to make sure that 
these institutions satisfy some minimal standards of accountability.5
 
  I am not ready to 
adopt this conclusion as an account of legitimacy but I offer this paper as a challenge to 
the thought that the application of more ambitious principles of legitimacy can be 
reasonably applied to international institutions.  
Problems Concerning the Ground of Transnational and Global Democracy 
The reasoning with which I introduced this paper suggests that powerful global 
institutions are necessary to treat persons as equals in the process of collective decision-
making about global issues.  The main principle of legitimacy we have for centralized 
political decision-making is democracy.  Democratic decision-making is a method of 
collective decision-making that publicly treats persons as equals when there is substantial 
disagreement and conflict of interest over matters of common concern.  Though all the 
outcomes of democratic decision-making will inevitably be opposed by many and a large 
proportion will be unjust, the method confers legitimacy on the results by publicly 
                                                 
5 See (Buchanan and Keohane 2006) for this conception of legitimacy.  The basic worry 
about this view is that though it does list some properties that it would be desirable for 
international institutions to have, it is hard to see how these properties can ground a right 
to rule for those institutions and associated content independent duties. 
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treating all the participants as equals, at least as long as the results satisfy some minimal 
standards of justice.  Hence, many political theorists and philosophers have naturally 
turned to global democracy as a potential source of legitimacy for international 
institutions.  By “global democracy” in this section, I mean a centralized democratic 
decision-making process for solving global problems.  These processes would involve a 
global legislature directly elected by the world’s adult population.6
 
  It would operate in a 
roughly majoritarian way within certain limits grounded in basic human rights.  I want to 
suggest three serious difficulties for the thesis that collective decision-making ought to be 
done in this way at least for the near to medium term future.  
The Problem of Stakes 
It is often argued that global democracy or transnational democracy can be grounded in 
the fact that people’s activities all around the world have effects on people in other parts 
of the globe.  Since people’s activities in different parts of the globe have effects on those 
in other parts, each should have a say in the overall organization of the globe.  Each 
should have a say in what affects him or her.  This argument has been put in different 
ways.  Some have noted that actions of persons in one part of the world affect peoples in 
other parts of the world and so they all ought to have an equal say.  This might be called 
the “all affected” principle.  Others note that actions of persons in one part of the world 
engage and direct the actions of persons elsewhere.  Another criterion is that actions of 
                                                 
6 See (Marchetti 2010) for a discussion of this model and for references to the large 
literature on it. 
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persons in one part of the world affect at least some of the fundamental interests of those 
in other parts of the world.7
 But these arguments fail to take into account one of the basic requirements for the 
desirability of democratic decision making.  I have argued elsewhere that for democracy 
genuinely to treat people as equals, the combination of issues on which democracy 
decides must be one in which individuals have roughly equal stakes overall.
 
8
                                                 
7  See (Gould 2004:176-180) for a review and critique of some different approaches and a 
defence of the approach that makes human rights central to determination of who ought 
to have a say in collective decisions.  See also (Pogge, 2002).  
  It is not 
enough that people are affected, or that some of their fundamental interests are affected, it 
must be that their fates are somehow mostly equally bound up with the package of issues 
they are dealing with.  If two people have an equal say in a matter that affects one 
person’s interests much more than the other’s interests and there are no other issues 
wherein the other’s interests are more implicated, then it appears that there is some 
unfairness in them having an equal say.  And the same holds for combinations of issues.  
If two people have fundamental interests in collective decisions over some combination 
of issues but the interests of one are much more bound up with that set of issues than the 
other’s are, it does not seem fair to give each an equal voice.  Indeed, it would seem that 
this would amount to not treating the people in question as equals.  Normally in those 
contexts in which people are likely to have very different stakes in issues to be decided, 
some kind of right of veto or exit is accorded each person, with which they can protect 
8 See (Christiano 2008). 
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their interests.  The matters are not decided by majority rule unless they are parts of 
larger combinations of issues in which the person’s have equal stakes overall. 
This is why democracy is particularly desirable at the modern state level in the 
modern world.  At least in the normal case, individuals inhabit a world in common with 
others in which the fundamental interests of all are implicated.  In such a political 
community there is a rough equality of stake for all the individuals.  As a consequence, 
giving each person an equal voice is a fair way of distributing power among them. 
 But this cannot be said of individuals in different states.  First, though their lives 
are mutually affected in a variety of ways they are not mutually affected to the same deep 
extent as the lives of members of a single modern state are.  Overall, my interests are far 
more bound up with the interests of other persons in the United States than they are with 
persons in China or even in Canada even though there are clear ways in which we of 
different political societies influence each others lives.  We do not inhabit common 
worlds with these other people.  This is at least in part the implication of current 
institutionalist approaches to development economics, which assert that the main 
determinant of the economic well-being of a country is the set of domestic institutions 
that country has.9
 But, second and more important, it is not clear that we have equal stakes in the 
decisions or the combinations of decisions that are made by transnational and global 
institutions.   As a general rule there are inequalities of stakes in larger transnational 
institutions.  For instance, in the World Trade Organization some member states have far 
   
                                                 
9 See (Rodrik 2007:184) ‘There is now widespread agreement among economists 
studying economic growth that institutional quality holds the key to prevailing patterns of 
prosperity around the world.’ 
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greater stakes in external trade than other states, as can be seen from their very different 
export to GDP ratios.  But a democratic principle would appear to give them all equal 
voices.  And thus the necessary condition for the intrinsic fairness of democratic 
decision-making seems not to hold in the case of transnational institutions or global ones. 
The legitimacy of such institutions must always be called into question since it is unclear 
that equality of stakes is present. 
 These difficulties are magnified by the requirement that I have defended, which is 
that democracy publicly realize equality among citizens.  This demands that the equality 
be one that everyone can see to be in effect among them.  I have argued that this is a key 
element in the argument for the intrinsic desirability of democracy.  But if we have good 
reason to think that transnational institutions are unlikely to involve equality of stakes in 
the sets of decisions they make, there is a very strong reason for thinking that these 
collective decision making areas cannot be egalitarian in a publicly clear way to all the 
members.   Many will have good reasons for complaining that their interests are being 
given less than equal consideration on the grounds that others are given an equal say in 
matters that affect their interests more deeply than the interests of the others.  Even if 
these complaints are not always justified, the appearance of inequity will not go away in 
these contexts.  So we have here a general normative worry about the appropriateness of 
democratic decision-making in the context of global collective decision-making. 
 
The Problem of Persistent Minorities on a Global Scale 
The second problem I want to discuss here is the problem of persistent minorities.  In my 
view, the presence of persistent minorities in the modern democratic state undercuts the 
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authority of the state with respect to those minorities.  This is a significant problem in 
modern states as they are.10
 To be sure, not all minorities would be lost since some of them could make 
common cause with others on the larger global scale.  And presumably global democratic 
institutions would have to be ruled by coalitions of different groups each of which is a 
minority on its own.  Still in a world as diverse as the one we live in, it seems hard to 
imagine that there will not be large portions of humanity that will find themselves not 
part of any winning coalition for significant periods of time.  We see this already in 
modern states where the level of diversity is generally considerably smaller than the 
world overall. 
  But it would appear to be an even greater problem in global 
and transnational institutions if they were fully democratized.  The larger the 
constituency, the larger the chances are that particular minorities would simply get lost in 
the democratic decision-making.   
 But as I have argued elsewhere, the presence of persistent minorities undercuts 
the authority of the democratic assembly at least with regard to the persistent minority 
and it weakens the authority secondarily with regard to the rest of the population.  The 
consequence of this is that we can infer that the authority of global democratic 
institutions will be severely weakened by this problem. 
 The way these problems are sometimes resolved in modern states is through the 
devices of political autonomy and consensual institutions.  In the case of political 
autonomy, the most extreme measure available is secession but less extreme methods are 
also available such as partial political autonomy for a particular region and a federal 
                                                 
10 I argue this in some detail in chapter 7 of (Christiano 2008). 
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structure of governance.  In these two kinds of institutional structures the problem of the 
persistent minority is partly resolved by allowing the minority to make decisions for itself 
either as an independent political unit or at least to make some broad class of decisions 
for itself. 
 Alternatively, these problems have sometimes been solved by methods of 
consensus politics including supermajority rules on some or all issues or some kind of 
consociational decision-making process.  These kinds of rules ensure that the minority 
has some say by requiring that the supermajority be large enough so that it has to include 
the minority group in the final decisions. 
 As I see it, both of these kinds of devices are somewhat non democratic.  They 
involve departures from egalitarian ways of making decisions.  The establishment of 
political autonomy involves cutting out a piece of the common world so that only a small 
group has a say over it even though many persons’ interests are deeply implicated.  Over 
some issues only some of those whose fundamental interests are implicated in the 
decision have a say over those issues when political autonomy is established within a 
common world.   
 In the case of consensus decision-making rules, the rules are not democratic to the 
extent that they give minorities a kind of veto over the decisions.  Instead of each having 
an equal say, a minority has a kind of veto power though it may not be the minority 
whose interests we are trying to protect.  The reason for majority rule is that it is the one 
rule for decision-making that seems to treat each person as an equal in a variety of 
different ways.  The more we move towards supermajority rule, the more we endanger 
the equality in the decision-making.  Of course, it may be necessary to do this under 
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certain circumstances, circumstances that the underlying principle of equality seems to 
pick out.  But we should not be deceived into thinking that the consequent institutional 
structure is entirely democratic. 
 In addition, to the extent that we are talking about global governance institutions, 
it is not clear what the possibility of secession amounts to.  It would appear that secession 
would simply imply that the institutions are not global after all.  If we were to insist on 
global institutions, the possibility of secession would be ruled out.  And thus one possible 
remedy for the problem of persistent minorities would be ruled out by global institutions 
even though the problem itself is likely to be far greater than it is at the national level. 
 The problem of persistent minorities, I have argued, cuts right at the heart of the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions and so democratic global institutions would start life 
with a very serious obstacle to establishing their genuine legitimacy.   Thus we seem to 
be able to anticipate a very significant problem of persistent minorities on the global scale 
without some main devices, such as secession, that can be used to remedy this problem.  
Alternatively, the use of political autonomy and consociational decision-making move us 
more in the direction of fair voluntary association among equals. 
 
The Problem of Citizenship at the Global Level 
There is one more difficulty that I want to raise for prospects of global or even 
transnational democracy.  One difficulty concerning citizenship in large states is that 
citizens have little incentive to become informed about matters of politics because they 
have so little impact on the outcomes of decision-making.  Economists defend the idea 
that citizens are rationally ignorant on the grounds that a citizen cannot advance his or her 
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interests through the political process.11
 This problem is likely to be increased when it comes to decision-making in 
transnational or global institutions.  Here the greater size of the constituencies combined 
with the even greater complexity of the issues at stake suggest that citizens are even less 
likely to vote in an informed way about matters connected to global institutions than they 
are in national democratic decisions.  This worry is confirmed by the widespread 
observation that citizens of various countries tend to be far less informed about the 
foreign policies of their states than they are about the domestic policies.
  But one need not agree with economists that 
citizens are exclusively concerned with narrow self-interest to think that there is a 
genuine problem here.  First, it is well observed that citizens are not very well informed 
about politics in modern democratic states.  Second, the sense of responsibility that is 
often necessary to engage the moral capacities is highly attenuated in the case of voting 
in large-scale democracies.  Where one has little sense of responsibility for outcomes and 
the complexity of issues is very hard to grasp, it is hard to become interested in the moral 
issues that are involved in the decisions even if one is a moral person overall.   
12
 To some degree, citizens do seem to solve some of the problems relating to low 
levels of information in politics.  They make decisions that help them advance their 
interests.  But the way they solve them in part is by taking short cuts to information that 
are made available to them by established and settled political institutions such as interest 
groups and political parties.   For instance, particular citizens tend to follow certain 
   
                                                 
11 See (Downs 1957) for an account of this problem and for its implications for equality.   
12  See (Dahl 1999) for a detailed discussion of this problem and the difficulties relating 
to citizens’ knowledge of foreign policy.  I agree in large part with his main conclusions. 
Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible?  Thomas Christiano             15 
 
opinion leaders’ judgments and the positions of their political parties.13  The main point I 
wish to make here is that citizens overcome some of the problem of information in 
decision making with the help of settled institutions in civil society.  These institutions 
are essential to making democracy possible even to the imperfect extent that it is in 
modern states.14
 The worry I wish to suggest here is that the danger of complete elite control of 
governmental institutions becomes very alarming when we consider global or 
transnational institutions, in the light of the problem of citizen information briefly 
sketched above.  In addition, in the absence of established and settled institutions for 
debate and discussion like political parties and interest groups that are connected to 
citizens it is hard to see how the problem of information can be mitigated on the global 
scale.  This is admittedly a problem that need not last forever but it is one that is likely to 
last for a very long time.  This is because it is hard to see how non-governmental 
  And it is important that these are long established and settled 
institutions precisely because it is only under these conditions that citizens can rationally 
come to trust these institutions so as to use them as shortcuts for important information.  
These institutional devices, imperfect as they are, are what stave off complete elite 
control of government. 
                                                 
13 See generally (Popkin 1990) for an excellent review of many cognitive shortcuts 
citizens take in making decisions about who to vote for in elections. 
14 See (Christiano 1996), especially chapters 5-8, for discussion of the question of what 
citizens ought to know if they are to participate as equals in a democratic process and of 
the institutional devices by which the problem of citizen information can be at least partly 
overcome. 
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institutions of global reach such as political parties can establish the kind of trust that is 
necessary for citizens to be able to rely on them in the process of participation.  Even in 
the case of the European Union, which has had European decision making institutions for 
many years, strong European wide institutions like political parties and interest groups 
have yet to arise.  Therefore, the prospects for real democracy on the global level are not 
likely to be very good for a very long time.   
 It seems to me that the consequent dangers of elite control of transnational and 
global democratic institutions are likely to be with us for a long time.  These dangers 
undercut the claim of such institutions to be in accord with the ideals that underpin 
democracy.  And so we must be very sceptical about arguments that attempt to apply 
ideas of democracy on a global or transnational scale. 
 
Fair Voluntary Association among Democratic States 
I have argued against global democracy as a way of addressing collective action 
problems in the world as a whole.  Now I want to consider the problem of legitimacy 
from the standpoint of fair voluntary association.  This is the natural alternative to global 
democracy as a way of thinking about the legitimacy of international institutions.  It is 
one that I have defended elsewhere, but which I now worry about.15
                                                 
15 See (Christiano 2010). 
  I will proceed by 
briefly describing this conception and its rationale.  I will then discuss an issue which is 
normally at the root of this conception of legitimacy: conceiving of international law as 
composed of treaties that are thought of on the model of contracts among states.  The 
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contract model is highly problematic as a way of understanding treaties and it 
misrepresents the role treaties can play in the international arena. 
 First I will briefly set out the idea of fair voluntary association among democratic 
states.  The idea is rooted in the traditional doctrine of state consent as the basis of the 
legitimacy of international law and institutions.  The traditional idea is that international 
law and institutions are made legitimate and have binding force as a result of the consent 
states give in the process of making treaties.  The fundamental principle is “pacta sunt 
servanda.”  There is something like a doctrine of tacit consent to customary international 
law.  When a practice becomes regularized and a state does not state objections to 
participation in the practice, the state is then often thought of as bound to customary 
international law.  For the most part the consent must be voluntary.  The idea is that 
because states are bound to act in accordance with international law they must consent to 
it.  There are some exceptions to the requirement of voluntary consent.  Jus cogens norms 
bind states whether they consent or not and states may not abridge these norms in the 
making of treaties.  These norms include norms against aggressive war, genocide, torture, 
piracy and slavery.  And states may be coerced into accepting peace treaties if they have 
been the aggressors.   
 The traditional doctrine is based on the idea that states are the entities that are 
directed to act in international law.  Individuals are not so directed in traditional 
international law.  But as international law begins to intrude on national legal systems 
through requirements on the domestic economic system in trade law and environmental 
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law as well as in human rights law, it is beginning to direct the actions of individuals.  
Hence the traditional reason for state consent is being undermined to some extent.16
 But we might think that we can preserve the doctrine of state consent as long as 
we introduce the requirement that the states represent their peoples as equals.  This 
extends the binding character of consent through states to the individuals in those states 
whose actions are now being more and more constrained by international law.  To be 
sure, this requires that the state be robustly democratic, that it give adequate protection 
and representation to minorities and that it’s foreign policy establishment be significantly 
more democratic than it currently is.  Only then is there some reason to think that the 
consent of the state really does in some way reach all the way down to the individuals.  
The consent of highly representative states may be a kind of hybrid of consent and 
democratic legitimacy.   
 
 In addition to the requirement of democracy, the state consent model needs to be 
supplemented with an account of fair negotiation of treaties, so that the consent of a state 
is not given under duress or other conditions that defeat the voluntariness of the 
agreements.  Furthermore, since we are concerned here with the consent of states binding 
the equal individuals in the states, we must have a conception of fair negotiation that does 
not allow inequalities among states to play a large role in determining the distribution of 
advantages among persons in the different states.  To be sure, the conception of equality 
required here does not require equality in welfare or material wealth, it requires 
something analogous to the equality in democratic decision-making.   The idea is that 
broadly speaking we can say that persons have an equal say in the determination of the 
                                                 
16 See (Bodansky, 1999) for a discussion of this issue. 
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treaties than bind them.  Partly that is provided by the fact that the states are democratic, 
but partly we must develop principles that discern when states are taking unfair 
advantage of others.  This conception of fair negotiation is the least well worked out part 
of the whole picture I am hoping to elaborate.   
 The hope with this conception of legitimacy is that it can build on something that 
is already in part in place in the modern international system.  We have reasonably 
democratic states that accord significant protections to minorities and which make some 
effort to make the process of treaty making democratic, though not enough.  Of course, 
the conception is quite demanding as well since it requires that all states be democratic 
and it requires that there be some mechanism for assessing when states take unfair 
advantage of others and how to rectify this kind of exploitation. 
 It is worth noting here how conceiving of the legitimacy of international law and 
institutions as based in state consent provides some relief from the problems we noted 
with global democracy.  First, to the extent that it is liberal democratic states that engage 
in contract making for their advantage, the problem of citizenship that looms so large in 
the case of global democracy is diminished somewhat.  Citizens can use all the devices of 
civil society within their own societies to inform themselves of the activities of their 
governments (assuming the foreign policy establishments are more democratic than they 
currently are).   Second, the problem of persistent minorities is diminished because states 
can refuse to enter into negotiations and agreements.  The system of fair voluntary 
association implements a standard way of solving the problem of persistent minorities.  
Third, to the extent that the peoples in states have different stakes in decisions, they can 
regulate their interactions with others to reflect that fact.  States with high stakes in an 
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agreement can invest a lot of time and energy in it, while states with lesser stakes 
presumably will invest less time and energy.   
 A natural way of thinking about the agreements states make with each other is to 
model interstate agreements on contracts.  This gives us a way of thinking about the 
nature of interstate agreements and the conditions of their validity.  But I will reject this 
model in what follows.  The state consent model need not be essentially tied to contracts, 
though it usually is.  Obviously consent can be based on things aside from the advantage 
of the consenting party and it can have its purpose in something other than mutual 
advantage.  But once we separate state consent from the model of contract, we need to 
have a new way to think about state consent and its implications, as we will see. 
 
The Contract Model of International Treaties 
The contract model thinks of treaties as if they were contracts between states.  In doing 
this they suggest that the norms that govern the making of contracts ought to hold over 
the making of treaties as well.   This fundamental idea is at the basis of many modern 
conceptions of the legitimacy of international law and institutions.  The basic principle 
being that state consent is a necessary and sufficient condition of the legitimacy of 
international law and institutions.    
One important qualification on the usual contract model is necessary if we are to 
take a cosmopolitan standpoint on the problem of the legitimacy of international 
institutions.  From a cosmopolitan standpoint, the legitimacy of international institutions 
must ultimately be grounded in the interests of individuals not of states.  So for the 
contract model to serve as a model of legitimate institutions, it must be assumed that the 
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state parties adequately represent the individuals who are members of the states.  It seems 
to me that the only way that this can be done is if the states are democratic in a robust 
way.  Not only do they have liberal democratic institutions for decision making, they 
adequately represent minorities and their foreign policy establishments are significantly 
more democratic than they have been in the past.   
Here I want to discuss some considerations that have seemed to make the contract 
model plausible.  First the point of treaties has often been thought to be the mutual 
advantage of the state parties in the sense that they advance the interests of the states or 
their peoples understood in a non-moral sense.  The thought is that states engage in an 
exchange with each other of rights.  Once the state has made the treaty it is required to 
perform by right of the other state.  Hence, we have the principle of “pacta sunt 
servanda.”   
 We might think then that the normative evaluation of the treaty making is the 
same as that of the evaluation of contracts.  Contracts are often thought to have 
procedural and substantive dimensions that can be evaluated in terms of fairness.   The 
procedural conditions on the fairness of contract making usually have to do with the 
voluntariness of the participant in the making of the contract.  The two most frequent 
conditions are that the party be at least minimally informed or responsible for being 
informed and that the party has not been coerced or forced into the agreement.  A third 
condition often asserted is that the bargaining powers of the parties are not wildly 
asymmetric. 
The substantive conditions on the fairness of the exchange can include some 
notion of equality in the exchange between the participants.  This notion is very hard to 
Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible?  Thomas Christiano             22 
 
define clearly.  But it is often invoked in the context of unconscionable contracts where 
both procedural and substantive elements combine to render contracts invalid.  The 
standard philosophical description of such contracts involves taking unfair advantage of a 
person.  The idea is that as long as neither of the parties thinks of the exchange as 
essentially one of gift giving, if one of the parties is highly vulnerable to failure to make 
the contract and the exchange is highly disproportionate in favour of the non-vulnerable 
party, then it is thought that the non-vulnerable party is taking unfair advantage of the 
vulnerable one.   
The equality involved is not a distributive equality.  It is equality in the things 
exchanged.  An exchange is fair when what is received is equivalent in value to what is 
given.  The usual way of measuring the value of the things involved is in terms of 
competitive market price for the goods involved.  Here is a fairly straightforward 
application of this idea.  Suppose p is the usual price a hospital charges for administering 
a kind of life saving first aid to a person.   Now someone finds himself not far from a 
hospital bleeding to death but he is far enough that he cannot get there before death sets 
in and a doctor comes upon him with the means to save him by standard first aid.  The 
doctor demands a promise of payment that is ten times p and so massively greater than 
the standard price.  And let us suppose that the doctor does not have any unusual costs of 
her own at stake.  The contract between the bleeding person and the doctor for first aid in 
exchange for ten times p will not normally be thought to be a valid one.   Most have 
thought that this would constitute an exploitative offer and that the doctor was taking 
unfair advantage of the vulnerable person.  Though there are some straightforward cases 
such as the above one, the evaluation of agreements in terms of whether each gives and 
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receives in accordance with the competitive price is often going to be quite difficult.  This 
will depend on the proper characterization of the circumstances in which the pricing takes 
place.  How exactly to specify the conditions that are at least normally necessary and 
sufficient is quite difficult.  To my knowledge courts have tended to invalidate only the 
most seriously disproportionate contracts. 
So the standard conditions under which contracts are thought to be problematic 
are some kind of absence of voluntariness and exploitation.  And these considerations 
have dominated discussions of the legitimacy of international treaties.  So it looks as if 
the contract model is a good fit with international treaty making. 
But there some important respects in which the model of contract does not apply 
well to international treaties and this is what we will discuss now. 
 
Treaties and Justice 
Both Grotius and Vattel observe that many international treaties are concerned with 
establishing in treaty what the parties and individuals involved already have obligations 
to do.17
                                                 
17 See (Grotius 2005 Book II: 821) and (Vattel 2008: 345). 
  This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the modern law of human rights.  But 
it is also evident in the case of peace treaties, treaties not to interfere with each other’s 
commerce and other kinds of treaties.  In this respect, treaty making resembles the normal 
activities of law making in a political society.  Political societies legislate against murder, 
theft and rape not in order to create obligations where there were none before but in order 
more clearly to lay out the exact expectations that people are to have of one another so 
that the possibilities of misunderstanding are greatly diminished.  And in the modern 
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system of treaties some institutions of arbitration, deliberation and judgment usually 
accompany the treaties, such as the Committees on Human Rights established by the two 
major international covenants.  And in some cases enforcement mechanisms are set in 
place to rectify wrong doing by states.  This is still relatively rare.  But one can see that 
treaties and the institutions that they establish play some of the roles that the political and 
legal institutions of domestic political societies play.  Their object is to establish by 
known and settled law the terms of justice by which states are to interact with each other 
and with individuals. 
 This is distinct from the usual function of contracts, which are usually made 
against the background of purportedly just institutions.   Contracts create obligations 
against a background of law.  But treaties create law. 
 Another way in which treaties are connected with justice is in the structures of the 
agreements.  Some treaties do not purport to establish justice between the parties; they 
purport to be mutually advantageous agreements between the parties.  But even these are 
often structured in such as way as to acknowledge the importance of justice and fairness 
in the body of the treaty.  They express commitments to fair terms among the parties.  For 
example the treaties making up the WTO make the principle of non-discrimination the 
centrepiece of the agreements.  Partly this is to create more efficient treaties but partly it 
is to realize fairness in the treaties.  But the treaties creating the WTO and those that have 
been agreed upon within the structure of the WTO also are designed with an eye to 
fairness.  Developing societies are given special trade preferences in many such treaties 
and the principles underlying these trade preferences have affected the structures of the 
treaties ever since.  The idea is that developing countries are to be allowed special 
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exemptions on grounds of their vulnerability to changing prices in international trade.  
All of this is accompanied by the language of fairness in the negotiations and outcomes.18
 
 
To be sure, there is still much unfairness in the outcomes and the protestations of fairness 
are often window dressing but the point is that these are seen as necessary to a proper 
treaty.  The same holds of international environmental treaties.  They give special 
exemptions to developing countries so as not to retard their development.  Again these 
are normally defended in terms of fairness to the developing countries.   Again such a 
concern for fairness and justice in the terms of contracts is not a usual feature of 
contracts.   
Voluntariness 
Another feature of treaties that seems quite distinctive is that voluntariness is not required 
for some of them.  The Vienna Convention on Treaties states that treaties may not result 
from non-lawful coercion.  But it seems to leave open that treaties may result from lawful 
coercion.  And presumably this is the case with treaties that impose peace on an unjust 
aggressor.  These are often coercive but they are valid nevertheless.  This is quite distinct 
from contracts where lack of voluntariness, as long as it is not due to negligence, 
standardly defeats the validity of a contract.  In the case of coercively imposed peace 
treaties we are not looking at a standard case of mutual advantage in the sense that both 
parties regard the treaty as in their mutual advantage.   
 Here again, it seems that the basic reason why some peace treaties can be 
coercively imposed is that they tend to promote and preserve international peace and 
                                                 
18 See (Franck 1996) for a discussion of trade preferences and (Albin 2001) for a general 
discussion of fairness considerations in international negotiation. 
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justice.  To be sure they do this in a way that is quite different from the way states do this.  
They allow individual parties to realize justice through coercion in a way that is quite 
alien to political societies. 
 
Equality 
The principle of equality in exchange is fairly central to contract law and the doctrine of 
unconscionable contracts.19
 But this principle of contract law does not seem to be generally accepted in a lot 
of contemporary treaty making.  It is usually accepted, for example, that developing 
societies may benefit from special exemptions to treaty provisions or they may receive 
special treatment or “preferences” in international trade treaties and environmental 
treaties.  To be sure, these special treatments are granted only grudgingly and are often 
quite minimal, but they are there and they say something about treaties.  Treaties are not 
expected to obey the principle of equality in exchange, which suggests that they may not 
be merely exchanges.  They are not gifts either, which are the usual exceptions to 
equality in contract law. 
  Here the thought is that once we determine a reasonably 
competitive market price the value of a thing or service can be equated with that price.  
Exchanges that depart too far from that competitive market price are ruled invalid in 
many cases where no gift is intended.  That the departure must be great is usually thought 
to be the result of the courts unwillingness to micromanage exchanges and a humility in 
its ability to estimate the prices of goods. 
                                                 
19 See (Gordley 2001) for a defence of this principle. 
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 What are these special treatment provisions gesturing towards?  One natural 
interpretation is that they are gesturing towards a concern for distributive justice and 
fairness among peoples in the world. 
 In the case of contracts, the usual theory essentially involves setting the level of 
advantage of each party at zero for all the parties before the exchange.  There is no 
concern for the differential starting points of the different parties.  Distributive justice 
concerns are bracketed.  Only equality between the things exchanged seems to matter. 
 But treaties do not attempt to abstract fully from the background distributive 
concerns.  They seem to adjust for background disparities.  They do not attempt to rectify 
the injustice of unequal distribution but unequal starting points in terms of distribution of 
advantages are taken into account so that many treaties are decidedly asymmetrical.  In 
this respect, they are quite different from equal contracts. 
 
Important Differences between Treaties and Contracts  
So far I have noted that treaty making is much more concerned with issues of justice than 
we should expect if we conceive of treaties on the model of contract.  This argument has 
been an interpretative argument concerning contemporary practices in making treaties.  
But I think that there are good substantive reasons for the differences between treaties 
and contracts that we see.   
First, there is a much greater difference between macro justice considerations and 
micro justice considerations in the case of contract law.  In the case of contracts it often 
seems unfair to impose the main burdens of redistribution on individual agents.  They are 
usually only one of many millions of contributors to the actual distribution of advantages.  
Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible?  Thomas Christiano             28 
 
The problems of distributive justice require many persons to chip in their fair share.  
Requiring redistribution through contract would seem to be excessively and unfairly 
demanding on particular persons.  They are only one among many contributors to 
distributive inequity, but solving the problems through contracts would seem to impose 
the burden on them alone.  To be clear here, I am referring to redistribution in the content 
of the contract.  Many modern democratic states shape the law of contract so as to have 
some beneficial effect on the distribution of goods.  Minimum wage legislation is an 
example.  But this is not what I am referring to here.  I am referring to the fact that the 
contracting parties do not use contracts to achieve distributive justice.  They are usually 
concerned with more partial interests even though the state may attempt to effect the 
distribution of advantages by shaping the law of contracts.  Second, attempting to achieve 
redistribution through contracts seems to be an inefficient way of doing it because it is a 
highly uncoordinated way of doing this and because it would seem to dampen the 
incentives to trade.  The way distributive justice is best achieved in a political society is 
through some kind of unified tax and transfer system and through some kind of overall 
external regulation of markets.   
 Both of these points – the unfairness of imposing the burden of redistribution on 
contractors and the possibility of some general legal regulation and tax and transfer 
system -- are inapplicable at the international level.  At the international level the state is 
by far the most important player and will remain so for a while.  There is no state at the 
global level that can achieve justice through tax and transfer or through large-scale 
regulation.  Furthermore there are not many states and not very many large and wealthy 
states.  
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 These two points suggest that while transactions among individuals are not a 
suitable place for redistribution in domestic economies, transactions among states may be 
more suitable for redistribution in the global environment.  First, given the smaller 
number of states and the very small number of very wealthy states, it is not so clear that 
the type of collective action or coordination problems we would see at the individual 
contractor level in domestic societies occurs at the level of states.  Each individual 
wealthy state can make a significant dent in the distributive inequalities we see today.  
And the wealthy states could fairly easily coordinate with each other to achieve much 
more sizable redistribution.  Though there is no global agency for creating redistribution, 
there is the possibility of coordinated redistribution.   
 Second, the idea of contracts as equal exchange can only have legitimacy against 
the background of a reasonably fair distribution of advantages.  It makes little sense to 
require equal exchange between those who are impoverished and those who have a great 
deal.  Equal exchange can only work justly when people at least have enough to 
participate.  The idea in modern mixed economies is that markets can be legitimate to the 
extent to which everyone has enough to participate in them roughly as equals.  And the 
state makes some attempt, however imperfectly, to achieve the wide distribution of 
wealth necessary for this. 
 At the global level the extent of poverty and inequality seem to me to vitiate the 
idea that all the peoples of the world ought to engage in equal exchange with each other 
even if they could.  In addition, the extent of poverty and inequality also seem to me to 
imply that it is very difficult for many states to engage in equal exchange with other 
states.  The poorest countries often are very vulnerable and are liable to be taken unfair 
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advantage of in the current circumstances.  There is significant evidence of this taking 
unfair advantage in the case of the WTO in the last fifteen years.  This again points to the 
fact that with such extremes of inequality and poverty, the background conditions that 
can ensure fair negotiations are not present. 
One main way to express this substantive argument is via the idea of the moral 
division of labour between institutional and individual pursuits in society and its relative 
absence in international relations.  That contract is normally used in a society to advance 
the partial concerns of the contractors within the limits set by fairness is a function of the 
importance of the moral division of labour.  The idea here is that the central concerns of 
justice are primarily assured by institutional arrangements.  These arrangements 
established by property and contract law, regulation, public ownership and tax and 
transfer assure distributive justice and the basic political and civil rights.  The institutions 
are designed so as to ensure that when people act on their partial concerns, the aims of 
distributive justice are secured.  In contracting and associating with others, individuals 
are not required to take justice as their aim at least most of the time.  They are permitted 
to act partially, again within limits set by fairness and the background institutions of 
society (framed with the purpose of achieving justice).  This division of labour is justified 
by three main considerations.  One, individuals’ actions have very small effects on justice 
and there is great difficulty in organizing coordination and cooperation without state 
institutions.  Two, this permits a reasonably fair distribution of burdens and benefits.  It is 
important for the aim of justice that each pursues his or her interests in his or her own 
way.  Three, there may also be some room for persons to pursue their own projects 
without always focusing on the impartial good.     
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 So within limits individuals are permitted to pursue their own interests via 
contract to some significant degree.  This characteristic structure of aims in the case of 
contract and voluntary association is distinct from the structure of aims of a person qua 
citizen or legislator.  In the role of citizens persons are expected to aim at justice and the 
common good in their actions of voting, organizing, negotiating and deliberating.  Of 
course, they may look out for their own interests in the process but the dominant concern 
is normally justice and the common good.  Here the division of labour can be understood 
as a division between the roles of persons qua citizens and persons qua individual agents. 
 One way to express the difference between treaties and contracts is to say that 
while contracts take place within the moral division of labour that permits limited self-
interest seeking, treaties do not take place in the context of a moral division of labour.  
The considerations that favour the role of contracts in the division of labour do not 
suggest such a role for treaties.  First of all, treaty making does not take place against a 
background set of institutions that secure justice for all.  Or if it does, those institutions 
are themselves established by treaty.  In fact, they take place against the background of 
horrendous inequality and poverty.  Secondly, treaties are made by states that are small in 
number and that are relatively easy to coordinate and organize for the common good 
(especially the small number of wealthy states).  These can have a great impact on global 
justice.  The burdens must be distributed fairly but this is much easier to do at the level of 
states.  Finally, states per se do not have interests, individuals do and so the kind of 
personal prerogative that contract serves is not served by giving free rein to states.  States 
already provide room for this prerogative within their political societies. 
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 So, it seems to me that states must pursue the aims of justice in the context of 
treaty making.  The structure of motivation here should be much like the situation or 
motivation of citizens or legislators.   
 This reasoning applies initially to ideal theorizing but I think it also holds in non-
ideal situations to some degree as well.  The moral division of labour holds to some 
degree in the non-ideal context. 
 To take stock here, I am arguing that international treaties ought not to be 
understood on the model of contracts because many treaties simply establish justice, they 
often depart from the principle of equality in exchange and treaties are a much more 
plausible site of distributive justice than contracts since they do not have the same role 
contracts to in a moral division of labor. 
 In a way all the points that I have been making about the centrality of justice to 
treaty-making can be confirmed by the fact that international treaties are thought to create 
international law.  And law, it seems to me, has the function of establishing justice among 
persons. 
 To be sure, not every treaty need implement justice in all respects.  Just as only 
the system of domestic law and policy is supposed to realize justice so the system of 
treaties ought to be devoted to realizing justice on a cosmopolitan scale. 
 
External Effects 
Another related worry is that the idea of legitimacy of treaties grounded in state consent 
may allow for large external effects on those states that do not consent.20
                                                 
20 See (Bodansky, 1999) for this. 
  This is an 
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obvious worry for the contract model in which states agree to treaties based primarily on 
their interests.  To the extent that the interests of non-participants are negatively affected 
and there is no larger set of institutions to rectify the illegitimate setbacks to interests, the 
scheme does not adequately take into account the interests of all affected.   
But the worry remains even if we reject the contract model and expect states to 
act on the basis of an assessment of justice and the common good.  The reason why is 
grounded in a fairly basic principle behind democracy.  We expect people’s judgments of 
justice and the common good to be biased towards their own interests, in ways that are 
hard to defeat even if they are acting conscientiously.   So we can expect that when states 
make agreements amongst themselves, the external effects of those actions on others will 
not usually adequately take into account the interests of those negatively affected. 
 
Democracy 
A final worry is that most states are not democratic to the extent necessary to make it 
possible that they can be said to represent their peoples.  Most states now are at least 
formally democratic, but many of these are not democratic in a way that assures serious 
representation.  Many elections are undertaken in an atmosphere of severe intimidation of 
the opposition.  Many elections are fixed in ways that it is hard for election monitors to 
detect.  So many states that are formally democratic in the sense that they abide by 
majority rule with universal suffrage and little of no legal barriers to competition do not 
represent their peoples well at all. 
 How are these peoples to be accommodated within a process of negotiation 
among states?  When states that are not democratic negotiate with states that are 
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democratic with an eye towards creating international law that impinges on the domestic 
legal systems of the society, it seems that we may describe this as a kind of imposition of 
international law on the populations that are not participating in their political societies.  
They have little voice and their interests are only very partially registered by the elites in 
their society.  It seems that the consent of these states can do very little by way of 
conferring legitimacy on the agreements in a cosmopolitan picture devoted to legitimacy 
grounded in persons. 
 In some circumstances the international institutions created by democratic and 
non-democratic states may be legitimate for the democratic states but not for the non-
democratic states.  This may happen when the agreements require things of each state 
that are separable in the sense that one state’s compliance does not require another state’s 
compliance.  Then members of the democratic state may be duty bound to comply by the 
agreement.  But in those cases where there is no separability and what the democratic 
state is required to do impinges on the interests of the non-consenting members of the 
non-democratic state, then there is a threat to the legitimacy of the system overall.  The 
duties of the citizens of the democracy must normally be defeated when what they are 
required to do constitute impositions on the subjects of the non-democratic states.  They 
are in effect colluding with the elites of the non-democratic state to take advantage of the 
incapacities of the non-democratic subjects.21
 In a way these last two problems of external effects and non-democratic states are 
analogs of the problems of persistent minorities and absence of civil society in the case of 
 
                                                 
21 This is a kind of general account of the danger Thomas Pogge points to in his 
discussion of the international resource and borrowing privileges.  See (Pogge, 2002). 
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global democracy.  In the first case there is a failure of inclusion and in the second there 
is a failure of representation of the people by their rulers.   
 
The Puzzle of Legitimacy 
If we think of international law in this way, there is a great deal of significance for how to 
think of fairness in the processes of making international law.  The most obvious one is 
that the fairness of negotiations cannot be evaluated in terms of the traditional norms of 
contract such as equality and voluntariness.  More generally, we should not think of 
international negotiation on the model of bargaining and the standards of bargaining 
theory.  The norms of justice are really the principal norms that apply to the outcomes of 
treaty making.  Treaties have the function of establishing justice in the world as a whole.  
As a consequence, the process of making international law must become a deliberative 
process in part where alternative conceptions of justice and the common good are debated 
and discussed among societies and where negotiation and compromise are used when 
disagreement cannot be resolved.  Though a concern to advance the interests of the 
society represented by the state is legitimate, it must always be within the context of a 
larger shared concern for the common good and justice. 
 To be sure, if international treaties are to be made in a way that treats persons as 
equals the conditions under which agreements among states can be made legitimate must 
be constrained by certain procedural norms.  These norms must give rise to fair processes 
of negotiation and deliberation among societies about the common good and justice.  
Obviously they will have to protect societies from having to negotiate from positions of 
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excessive vulnerability and they will have to ensure some kind of equality in the process 
of negotiation and deliberation among societies.   
These points suggest that we need to develop a conception of fair deliberation and 
negotiation among groups that we currently don’t have at least for the case of 
decentralized voluntary association.  They also suggest that there is some need for 
background global institutions to rectify excessive inequalities and to ensure that the 
conditions of deliberation and negotiation are reasonably fair as well as inclusive.  This 
seems to drive us in the direction of global institutions, which in turn must to be 
evaluated in terms of democratic principles. 
 But this leaves us at a kind of impasse.  We find ourselves in the position, which 
usually calls for democratic deliberation and decision-making but without the possibility 
of global democratic institutions.  We have individual states negotiating with each other 
but the usual standards of contract do not apply and there is little to ensure that the 
negotiations are fair or sufficiently inclusive.  This means that the two central ways in 
which group decisions come to be legitimate in domestic societies are not in the offing in 
the case of international collective decision-making.  Democracy and voluntary 
association are both problematic from the standpoint of justice and legitimacy when in 
the context of international decision making. 
 Clearly this menu of choices for grounds of legitimacy is too small but it is hard 
to know where to proceed to from here.  One possible avenue for further exploration 
might be to examine some different varieties of multilateral institutions in which many 
states must agree together on certain policies.22
                                                 
22 (Moellendorf 2008) chapter 8. 
  Some of the bargaining disadvantages of 
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developing societies could be partly offset in this context by the fact that there are many 
developing societies and that they can form powerful coalitions to counter the bargaining 
power of the developed societies.  I do not have the time to explore this option here in 
sufficient detail but this method suffers from the usual defects of consensus based 
systems in which there is a very diverse set of parties who do not share common goals or 
values.  When serious interests conflict, they fail to make decisions and tend to favour the 
status quo.  And it tends to be the most powerful and wealthy states who benefit most 
from the status quo, so they have significant bargaining advantages in multilateral 
institutions, particularly if the wealthy and powerful states can make common cause.  
And we have clear records of very great disparities in bargaining power playing a large 
role in determining how these multilateral institutions develop.  We need only look at the 
formation of the United Nations in the San Francisco conference and the formation of the 
WTO in the Uruguay round to see how powerful states, when they can form coalitions, 
can determine how these go.23
 The other approach that has been taken by a number of recent theorists is the idea 
of informal democracy.  The idea here is that global society can be regulated in some way 
by a global civil society in which non-governmental organizations and other non-state 
groups, which are made accountable to people, engage in a decentralized global process 
of deliberation that is meant to exert pressure on states and corporations.
  Perhaps there is some way to limit this kind of unfair 
taking advantage but it is hard to see how given the distribution of wealth in the world as 
a whole. 
24
                                                 
23 See (Steinberg 2002) for the WTO.  See (Schlesinger 2003:223) for a discussion of the 
hard bargaining behind the creation of the Security Council Great Power veto. 
  The study of 
24 See the contribution of (MacDonald 2010) in this volume for this approach. 
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global civil society and its potential contribution to a genuinely cosmopolitan approach to 
global decision-making is essential, but there are a number of difficulties with this 
approach.  One is that there is no real way of publicly realizing equality in this highly 
complex and fluid process of deliberation.  One suspects that power could well be 
wielded by elites in this process.  The suspicion is increased when one notes that the non-
governmental organizations that exist seem primarily to represent the standpoints of 
groups in wealthy western democracies.  Two, while non-governmental organizations are 
clearly a very important part of global decision-making it is hard to see how they can be 
more than inputs into a more formal system of decision-making.  This kind of view has 
not given us an adequate account of how power is exercised and decisions are made.25
 
 
Conclusion 
The arguments of this paper are very sceptical.  I have argued against global democracy.  
I have called into question the idea that fair voluntary association among democratic 
states, as I have understood it, gives us a complete picture of legitimate global 
institutions.  It may be that the best we can do in constructing global institutions is to 
make sure that they respect and protect human rights and that they satisfy some basic 
standards of accountability such as transparency.  I am not satisfied with this account 
partly because I don’t think it gives us legitimacy.  It may give us reason to think that the 
institutions will produce minimally desirable outcomes.  We may often have reason 
therefore to go along with those outcomes.  But it does not give us the kind of moral 
legitimacy that implies reasons to go along even when we disagree with the outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
25 See (Bohman 2007) for this insight. 
Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible?  Thomas Christiano             39 
 
To the question, is legitimacy possible in the current global order for the foreseeable 
future, the answer is I don’t know yet.  I continue to think that fair voluntary association 
among democratic states is the most likely account to give us a plausible model of 
legitimacy in a contemporary global society characterized by states being the main 
powers, but it is not clear to me how to work out the difficulties I have discussed.  
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